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Abstract
We investigate firms’ incentives to locate in the same region to gain access to a large pool
of skilled labor. Firms engage in risky R&D activities and thus create stochastic product
and implied labor demand. Agglomeration in a cluster is more likely in situations where
the innovation step is large and the probability for a firm to be the only innovator is high.
When firms cluster, they tend to invest more and take more risk in R&D compared to
spatially dispersed firms. Agglomeration is welfare maximizing, because expected labor
productivity is higher and firms choose a more ecient, technically diversified portfolio
of R&D projects at the industry level. (JEL: L13, O32, R12)
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of Market Structure in Network Industries” (FMRX-CT98-0203) and under the RTN Network ”The Economic
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like to thank Gilles Duranton, Rikard Forslid and seminar participants at Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona) and at
the RTN meeting in Villars for valuable comments on earlier drafts. All remaining errors are ours.
1 Introduction
Clusters play a central role in the spatial organization of some of the world’s most dynamic
and R&D intensive industries. The best known example is Silicon Valley that during the
90s was home to 20 per cent of the world’s 100 biggest electronics and software companies
(Business Week, August 5, 1997). Other well-known examples are the biotech cluster in La
Jolla (California), the neuroscience cluster in Oxford (UK) and the automotive industry in
the Stuttgart region (Germany). While these examples are interesting in themselves, there is
also more systematic evidence showing that firms in R&D intensive industries tend to cluster
their innovative as well as their productive activities more than other firms (Audretsch and
Feldman, 1996).
The success of some of these clusters has been remarkable. In spite of ups and downs
in employment during the 90s of the last century, the employment growth rate in Silicon
Valley outpaced with an impressive 15 per cent the U.S. national employment growth rate,
and the mean income was 50 per cent higher than the national figure (Audretsch, 1998). The
performance of Silicon Valley and other leading high-tech clusters has promoted a worldwide
interest in replicating them. Billions of dollars were spent by local, regional and national
governments to promote the formation of high-tech clusters. Yet overall success rates were
low, indicating that the forces behind these agglomeration processes are more subtle than
thought of heretofore.
In his Principles, Marshall (1920) argued that firms enjoy a number of benefits when
locating in a cluster.1 Firstly, the high demand for intermediate inputs allows upstream
suppliers to achieve a higher degree of specialization, leading to a more ecient division of
labor within the industry and lower prices due to decreasing marginal cost (Stigler, 1951;
Krugman, 1991b).
Secondly, technology spillovers enable firms inside a cluster to share information and
knowledge. There is empirical evidence demonstrating that firms’ productivity increases due
to technology spillovers with increasing geographical proximity (Acs et al., 1994; Almeida
and Kogut, 1999; Jae et al., 1993; summarized in Audretsch and Feldman, 2004). Recently,
a number of authors have analyzed spillover driven clustering from a theoretical perspective
(Combes and Duranton, 2005; Fosfuri and Rønde, 2004; Saint-Paul, 2003).
Thirdly and finally, the concentration of firms attracts a ’deep’ pool of laborers, which
is the benefit from clustering that we focus on in this paper. Marshall argued that firms
have incentives to locate in the same region when they face imperfectly correlated stochastic
1See Duranton and Puga (2004) for an excellent survey of the microeconomics of clusters.
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labor demands. Firms blessed with high output and labor demand can draw workers at low
cost from a large local labor market pool. Labor pooling thus provides firms with a more
elastic labor supply and workers with more job security. Although labor pooling probably
is the agglomeration benefit that has received the least attention in the literature, empirical
work suggests that it plays an important role for firms’ location decisions. Indeed, Rosenthal
and Strange (2002) regress an index of spatial industry localization on proxies for the three
above mentioned agglomeration benefits and find that the evidence is strongest for the labor
pooling argument.
Marshall’s labor pooling argument was first formalized in a stylized model by Krugman
(1991a, Ch. 2 and App. B). He analyzed location equilibria with n firms who produce under
decreasing returns to scale and face exogenous firm-specific productivity shocks. For fixed
regional labor supply, the expected wage is increasing in the number of firms, because firms
employ on average less workers and produce more eciently. At the same time, more firms in
a region also attract more workers, because of higher wages. Therefore, firms, upon deciding
their location, have to trade-o a larger labor supply with a higher labor cost. We further
explore the labor pooling argument by analyzing an explicit source of firm-specific shocks in
the form of stochastic research and development (R&D) outcomes. Our model unveils a new
benefit of labor pooling and oers novel, empirically verifiable predictions.
We consider a simple setup where two firms supply to a competitive world market. Firms
have access to a common technology that allows them to produce a basic quality, but un-
dertake risky R&D to improve on their product quality. The R&D shocks translate into
stochastic product, and therefore labor demands. Confronted with location decisions before
the outcome of these shocks becomes known, the firms decide to either locate separately in
small labor markets, or, followed by their labor pool, to jointly locate in a large labor market.
Firms may prefer separate locations in spite of the smaller labor supply, in order to enjoy
monopsony power in the labor markets and to avoid the competition for laborers that arises
under agglomeration.
We first look at a situation where innovations are the result of an exogenous R&D process.
We show that agglomeration in a cluster only occurs if, after the realization of the R&D
shocks, firms are likely to end up in an asymmetric situation where one of the firms pulls
significantly ahead in the R&D race. If this outcome arises ex-post, the leading firm is able to
enjoy the large labor supply at relatively low wages, because competition in the labor market
from the lagging firm is weak. By contrast, if firms produce products of similar qualities,
most of their profits are destroyed by labor market competition. Labor pooling has thus
two opposing eects on profits. It allows the leading firm to expand its production, which
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increases expected profits and constitutes the agglomerative force in our model. At the same
time, competition in the labor market dilutes profits, which works against agglomeration.
We then endogenize firms’ R&D strategies and thereby, implicitly, the labor demand
shocks. In particular, we analyze the two most important dimensions of R&D decisions,
namely the size and the technical risk of R&D investment. Interestingly, upon agglomeration,
ex-ante identical firms generically choose asymmetric R&D strategies to avoid joint success
and to reduce labor market competition. This contributes to a higher variance of average
firm productivity in agglomerations.
The welfare analysis shows that within our framework agglomeration of the firms is always
the preferred industry outcome. The superiority of a cluster relative to dispersed locations
in terms of welfare stems from two sources. Firstly, successful innovations are applied over a
larger base of workers due to a deeper labor pool (a ’labor productivity eect’). Secondly,
agglomeration in a cluster allows for a better organization of R&D programs within the
industry (an ’R&D portfolio eect’). This eect is the result of firms’ endogenous choice
of R&D strategy, and it represents a benefit of labor pooling that has not been discussed
heretofore. The intuition is that if the firms locate together in a cluster and both experience
R&D success, one of the innovations represents wasteful duplication of R&D eorts. The
asymmetric equilibrium strategies that reduce the likelihood of joint success increase thus
the eciency of the R&D portfolio at the industry level by reducing duplication. Since there
are clear cut regimes under which firms separate in equilibrium, there is too much locational
separation relative to the welfare optimum.
Apart from Krugman (1991a), Stahl and Walz (2001) is the only other formal model of
labor pooling known to us. Stahl and Walz introduce both firm-specific and sector-specific
(exogenous) shocks and analyze whether firms locate together with firms belonging to the
same or to a dierent sector. There is also a small literature on firms’ location decisions
relative to localized labor markets. However, Topel (1986), Baumgardner (1988), or more
recently Picard and Toulemonde (2000) all focus on issues dierent from ours, such as workers’
migration incentives, division of labor as changing with labor market size, and asymmetric
agglomeration as the result of minimum wages, respectively.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the section 2, we present our
baseline model of labor pooling with exogenous R&D strategies. In Section 3, we endogenize
R&D investment decisions and derive and characterize the equilibria of the game. In section
4, we analyze a variant of the model where firms choose the risk-return profile of the R&D
rather than the R&D investment level. We conclude by discussing implications of our analysis
and possible extensions. All relevant proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
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2 A Simple Model of Labor Pooling
2.1 The Model Set-Up
There are two firms 1 and 2, and two locations. The firms produce with a one-to-one produc-
tion function, so that Li units of labor employed by firm i at wage wi result in the identical
output quantity yi. With respect to their output, the firms are price takers in a world market.
The price obtained depends on the quality of the product. For simplicity, we assume that
the price pi fetched by firm i is equal to the quality of its product qi.
2 The firms’ marginal
production cost net of wages is normalized to zero, and fixed costs are sunk.
The firms are initially endowed with a technology to produce a good of quality v. They
may benefit from the outcome of a stochastic R&D process that for the moment is costless.
If the R&D project is successful, the product’s quality is increased to v +, with  > 0. If
the R&D project is unsuccessful, the firm has to produce the initial quality. We assume in
this section the simplest possible R&D process where there is an exogenous and independent
probability of success  for each firm.
In specifying labor supply, we follow the simple approach taken by Krugman (1991a).
There is a mass of L identical workers with industry-specific skills in the economy. Before
accepting a job, they are perfectly mobile between the two locations. However, once settled
in one region, the costs of migration become prohibitive.3 The workers are risk-neutral and
choose the location maximizing their expected wage. The opportunity wage outside the
industry for the workers is u < v, i.e. industry production is ecient with the initial product
quality.
The firms simultaneously choose their location. Henceforth we refer to outcomes of the
location subgame in which firms locate together as ’agglomeration’, and to outcomes with
diering locations as ’separation’. If the firms agglomerate, they compete in wages for the
skilled workers in the region. Firms simultaneously set wages and workers choose either the
firm oering the higher wage, or take the outside opportunity. In case of a tie at a wage that
is preferred to the outside option, workers split equally across the firms. If the firms choose
separate locations, they behave as monopsonists in their respective local labor market.
The timing of the game is as follows: 1) firms choose their location, 2) workers locate,
3) R&D outcomes are realized, 4) firms set wages and workers are hired, and 5) production
takes place and profits are realized. Our timing reflects that location decisions involve a longer
2This price would also be obtained if the two firms were monopolists in their respective market and N D L
consumers endowed with a utility function of U = q 3 p would buy at most one unit of the good.
3Introducing non-prohibitive ex-post migration costs would not agect the qualitative nature of our results.
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term commitment relative to R&D decisions, which in turn are less flexible than allocation
decisions involving wages.
2.2 Equilibrium Analysis
Suppose that firms have chosen separate locations. As each firm is a monopsonist in its
local labor market, workers are paid a wage that matches their outside opportunity u, and
this independently of the R&D outcome. Therefore, ex-ante, workers are indierent between
settling in the two regions, and the expected local labor supply is L/2. Then, firm i’s expected
profits under separation are
E(Si ) = (v + u)
L
2
+ (1 )(v  u)
L
2
(1)
=
L
2
(v  u+ ).
Obviously, the firms’ profits increase in the number of workers available, as well as in the
expected product quality net of the minimum wage, u.
Suppose now that firms have agglomerated in one region. The wage resulting from firms’
competition in the labor market depends on the outcome of the R&D process of both firms.
Lemma 1 Consider the labor market equilibrium when firms agglomerate.
i) If both firms produce at the same quality q  v, then the equilibrium wages are wWi = wWj = q.
Firms make no profit.
ii) If firm i produces at quality v+ and firm j at quality v, then the equilibrium wages are
wWi = v+ % and wWj = v, respectively. All workers supply to firm i. Firm i’s profit per worker
is , and firm j makes no profit.
Hence under agglomeration the firms’ competition for labor shifts rents to the workers.
When product qualities are symmetric, no matter whether both firms have innovated or not,
all profits are competed away in the labor market. By contrast, when only one firm innovates,
the successful firm drives the low quality firm out of the market and employs all available
workers at a wage above the workers’ outside opportunity. The expected profits of firm i
under agglomeration are therefore
E(Ai ) = (1 )L. (2)
Profits increase in the probability that only one firm is successful, (1 ), in the size of the
labor pool, and in the innovation step.
In the first stage of the game, firms simultaneously choose their location on the basis of ex-
pected profits. Comparing (1) and (2), the Nash equilibrium in locations can be summarized
as follows.
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Proposition 1 Agglomeration is the unique location outcome if  < 1/2 and
  e  v  u
(1 2)
. (3)
Otherwise, the firms choose separate locations.
The profits of a firm can come from two sources: the basic product quality available at
the industry level and firm specific product innovation. Under separation, both the basic
product quality and the innovation contribute to expected profits. Under agglomeration,
however, successful innovation is the only source of rents, because the profits that could
accrue from the basic product quality are competed away in the labor market. Hence, a
necessary condition for agglomeration to be the preferred option is that the expected profits
from successful innovation eorts must be greater than under separation.
Explaining the location trade-o in a dierent way, agglomeration has two opposing eects
on profits. On the one hand, it induces the formation of a large labor pool. Therefore the
firm with the higher product quality can expand its production more than under separation,
which increases expected profits. This is the agglomerative force. On the other hand, wages
increase via tougher competition for workers. Wage competition under agglomeration thus
constitutes the deglomerative force in the model.
Keeping these two forces in mind, the comparative statics of the model are easily under-
stood. Under agglomeration a firm is only able to hire workers at a profitable rate if it pulls
ahead in the R&D race and makes its workers more productive than the rival’s. Consequently,
agglomeration is more profitable if the innovation step, i.e. the productivity advantage of the
winning firm, is large. Agglomeration is also more likely if the R&D hazard rate is neither too
low (which would render innovation unlikely) nor too high (which renders likely simultaneous
innovation by both firms). The threshold of Proposition 1 takes its minimum value at a
hazard rate of 1/4, and separation equilibrium always obtains for   1/2. This relationship
is illustrated in Figure 1. Finally, wage competition under agglomeration destroys all rents
to firms from the initial technology. Thus, separation becomes the more attractive the higher
is v  u. This can also be seen from Figure 1 where the region of the parameter space for
which agglomeration is the equilibrium outcome is smaller for the higher value of v  u.
Turning to a welfare comparison, we have that expected social surplus, the sum of workers’
rents and firms’ profits, is maximized when firms agglomerate. Under agglomeration all
available labor produces the higher quality good if at least one of the firms is successful in
R&D. Under separation this is possible only if both firms are successful. Agglomeration has
therefore the advantage over separation that workers are always put to their most productive
use. We will refer to this agglomeration benefit as the ’labor productivity eect ’. The welfare
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Figure 1: Location equilibrium with exogenous R&D sucess probabilities for two dierent
values of v  u, (v  u)0 < (v  u)00.
implication of the location equilibrium in Proposition 1 is straightforward. There is (weakly)
too little agglomeration in equilibrium.
Albeit extremely simple, this benchmark model captures the central features of Marshall’s
labor pooling argument. Furthermore, it provides us with a framework that lends itself to
model endogenous R&D and to explore the interaction between location and innovation.
Before continuing to these issues, we would like to mention that the model can be reinterpreted
as a dynamic R&D model with catching-up in technology. Consider an infinite horizon model
in discrete time where the firms and workers choose their locations at the beginning of the
game. Innovations occur in discrete jumps (maximally one per period) along a ’quality ladder’
a` la Grossman and Helpman (1991) of the type qi = (1+)qi31. If one firm pulls ahead in a
period, the laggard catches up before the beginning of the next period. That is, firms start
the following period with equal qualities. It can be shown that such a dynamic R&D race
produces the same threshold e as in Proposition 1.
3 Endogenous R&D Investment
In the benchmark model firms’ location decisions were driven by exogenous shocks. These
shocks were referred to as innovations, but they could equally well be interpreted as demand
shocks. In this and the following section we take seriously the former interpretation, and
endogenize the shocks by explicitly modeling firms’ R&D decisions. This allows us to bring
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together two aspects heretofore not considered together, namely the choice of location, and
the choice of research technology. The aim is to analyze the interplay between labor market
competition and R&D decisions and how this, in turn, influences equilibrium location choices
and welfare conclusions.
In the industrial organization literature, two main dimensions of firms’ R&D activities are
identified: i) how much money to invest in R&D towards improvements relative to existing
products; and ii) how ambitious a R&D project to target.4 In the present section we look
at a situation where the investment decision monotonically increases the probability of R&D
success and the innovation size. In the ensuing section we consider, at fixed investment level,
a trade-o between success probability and innovation size.
3.1 Model with R&D Investment
In the simple model presented in the previous section, R&D was characterized by two ex-
ogenous parameters, , the probability of a successful innovation, and , its size. Without
alluding to specific examples it is dicult to say whether R&D investment aects , , or
both. We therefore start from a fairly general R&D technology and then look at two focal,
parameterized examples.
Returning to the specification of a general R&D technology, let firm i choose an R&D
intensity !i resulting in a probability of success (!i) and an innovation size (!i). Both
(!i) and (!i) are C2-functions. Let (·), (·) > 0 for !i > 0 and 0(·), 0(·)  0 with
at least one strictly positive slope. The cost of employing !i is specified by the C2-function
g(!i) where g(0) = g0(0) = 0 and g00(·) > 0. It is assumed that g(·) is suciently convex
so that the profit function of firm i is concave for !i < !j and for !i > !j , and that corner
solutions are excluded.5 Notice that in this formulation - and in contrast to section 4 - a
given R&D intensity !i results in separately determined i and i. Hence the firm cannot
trade o a higher i against a lower i, or vice versa.
In our baseline model the profits of the two firms were symmetric, since  and  were
identical for both firms. This led to a simple solution to the locational choice problem in the
first stage of our game, as firms always agreed on whether to locate jointly or separately. It
turns out that with endogenous R&D investments, equilibrium strategies and resulting profits
will be generically asymmetric under agglomeration. Hence situations can arise in which one
firm prefers separation and the other one agglomeration. Since firms are identical ex-ante, we
deal with this possibility by introducing an additional stage in our timing: After firms have
4See, e.g., Bhattacharya and Mookherjee (1986) or Dasgupta and Maskin (1987).
5By this we assume that the profit function is piecewise concave but not necessarily globally concave.
9
chosen locations, but before they choose R&D strategies, nature determines which one of the
firms will play the more research intensive strategy. The two firms are equally likely to be
assigned the role of the research intensive firm. At the stage where locations are chosen, the
firms’ expected profits are thus symmetric and the location choice can be analyzed as before.
3.2 Equilibrium Analysis
Towards an analysis of this extended model, suppose that in the first stage of the game the
firms have chosen separate locations. The expected profit of firm i is now given by
S(!i) = (!i)(v  u+(!i))L/2 + (1 (!i))(v  u)L/2 g(!i),
and the optimal research intensity !S,W solves the first-order condition
0(!S,W)(!S,W)L/2 + (!S,W)0(!S,W)L/2 g0(!S,W) = 0. (4)
Suppose now instead that firms have chosen to agglomerate in the first stage of the game.
Then, the outcome of the labor market competition depends on the outcome of the stochastic
R&D processes. A firm can draw all workers from the labor pool if its R&D project is the
only successful one in the industry. At the same time, for 0(!) > 0, the firm investing more
aims for a higher product quality and employs all skilled laborers in the event that both firms’
R&D projects are successful. Therefore, the expected profit of any firm i can be written as:
Ai (!i,!j) = (!i)(1 (!j))(!i)L g(!i) +(
0 if !i  !j ,
(!i)(!j)((!i)(!j))L otherwise.
Suppose without loss of generality that !i  !j . The first-order condition for the low-
investment firm i is
(1 (!A,Wj ))
h
0(!A,Wi )(!
A,W
i ) + (!
A,W
i )
0(!A,Wi )
i
L g0(!A,Wi ) = 0, (5)
while for the high-investment firm j it ish
0(!A,Wj )(!
A,W
j ) + (!
A,W
j )
0(!A,Wj ) 
0(!A,Wj )(!
A,W
i )(!
A,W
i )
i
L g0(!A,Wj ) = 0. (6)
It is easy to verify that the firms’ R&D investment choices are strategic substitutes.6
An increase in one firm’s R&D investment reduces the marginal value of the other firm’s
6Check that for two firms with i $ j it holds that Y
2ZAi (i,j)/(YiYj) = Y
2ZAj (i,j)/(YjYi) =
340(j)(4
0(i){(i) + 4(i){
0(i)) < 0.
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investment by decreasing the probability of having the only successful R&D project. Also, for
the higher investment firm j, investment by firm i decreases profits by reducing j’s eciency
advantage in case both firms are successful.
The following proposition characterizes the R&D equilibrium under agglomeration.
Proposition 2 Suppose that g(·) is suciently convex, and consider the equilibrium in R&D
investment strategies (!A,Wi ,!
A,W
j ) when firms agglomerate.
(i) If 0(!A,W) = 0, then there exists a unique, symmetric, pure-strategy equilibrium, !A,Wi =
!A,Wj = !
A,W in which the equilibrium investment satisfies
(1 (!A,W))0(!A,W)(!A,W)L g0(!A,W) = 0. (7)
(ii) If 0(!A,W) > 0, then there exists a generically unique pure-strategy equilibrium with
!A,Wi < !
A,W
j in which the equilibrium investment levels satisfy (5) and (6).
The equilibrium in investment strategies conditional upon firms’ agglomeration exhibits
some interesting properties. Specifically, as long as (·) is a strictly increasing function,
the ex-ante symmetric firms choose asymmetric R&D investments. The reason is that the
marginal return to R&D investment increases discretely as a firm’s investment becomes larger
than its competitor’s. The firm then produces a higher quality than its competitor when both
firms are successful and wins the labor market bidding for skilled laborers, which increases
the marginal return to R&D.7 This property induces firms to optimally dierentiate their
R&D strategies. The high investment firm benefits from more frequent and better innovation
and from full access to the labor pool in case of joint R&D success. The low investment firm
is better o saving on R&D expenditures, even if it only gains access to the entire labor pool
in situations where it is the sole innovator. Notwithstanding this optimal dierentiation of
R&D strategies, it is easy to show that, in equilibrium, the high investment firm j has higher
expected profits than firm i.8
Finally, given the fairly general functional form setup of the R&D technology, it is note-
worthy that Proposition 2 implies both existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy R&D
equilibrium.9
7Note, however, that the firm’s payog remains continuous at this investment level, because the profit margin
(price - wage) reflects the digerence in product quality.
8Verify that YZAi (i,j)/Yj < 0. Using this, the fact that 
A,W
i < 
A,W
j , and a revealed preference
argument, we have that ZAi (
A,W
i ,
A,W
j ) < Z
A
i (
A,W
i ,
A,W
i ) = Z
A
j (
A,W
i ,
A,W
i ) $ Z
A
j (
A,W
i ,
A,W
j ).
9To be precise, we are able to link the equilibrium and welfare analysis via the first-order conditions. We
then show that if g(·) is suciently convex, then there exists a unique solution to the welfare problem, which
implies that a unique equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
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Let us now turn to the determination of equilibrium location choices. By the assumption
that nature chooses with identical probability 1/2 whether upon agglomeration firm i is the
stronger or the weaker investor in R&D, agglomeration is the equilibrium outcome if and
only if
Ai (!
A,W
i ,!
A,W
j ) + 
A
j (!
A,W
j ,!
A,W
i )  2
S(!S,W). (8)
Otherwise, the firms will choose separate locations. The next proposition compares equilib-
rium investments under separation and agglomeration and further characterizes the location
equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Compare R&D investments and expected profits from innovation under the
two location choices:
(i) In a symmetric equilibrium, (!A,W) < 1/2 is a necessary and sucient condition for
firms to invest more in and to earn higher profits from R&D under agglomeration than under
separation.
(ii) In an asymmetric equilibrium with !A,Wi < !
A,W
j , (!
A,W
j ) < 1/2 is a sucient condition
for both firms to invest more in and to earn higher profits from R&D under agglomeration
than under separation.
(iii) If the expected equilibrium profits accruing from R&D are higher under agglomeration
than under separation, then there exists a unique level # > 0 such that in equilibrium, vu <
# implies agglomeration, and v  u > # implies separation.
As detailed in the discussion of the baseline model in section 2, expected profits under
separation are composed of the certain profits from the basic technology and the expected
profits from innovation, while under agglomeration firms only earn profits from innovation.
Thus, for agglomeration to be preferred, the profits from innovation under agglomeration
must exceed the profits from innovation under separation, and the basic technology must not
be too profitable. Point (iii) of Proposition 3 makes this argument precise.
Points (i) and (ii) of the proposition reflect the trade-o between innovating for a labor
pool of half the size under separation versus the loss of innovation rents from competition
under agglomeration. A firm invests more in R&D under agglomeration and ends up with
higher expected profits from innovation if the equilibrium hazard rate of its competitor is less
than 1/2. Though the conditions (!A,W) < 1/2 and (!A,Wj ) < 1/2 refer to endogenous rather
than exogenous parameters,10 it is clear that these conditions hold in equilibrium when it is
10We have formulated them this way in order to preserve the comparability of the results with those derived
in the other model versions.
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not feasible or too expensive to increase the hazard rate beyond 1/2, i.e. lim (!) < 1/2 as
!$4, or g(!)$4 as !$ 31(1/2). This will be illustrated in more detail in Example I
below.
Note also that in an asymmetric equilibrium, (!A,Wj ) < 1/2 is not a necessary condition
for agglomeration to occur. The expected ex-ante profits from R&D can be higher under
agglomeration for (!A,Wj ) > 1/2 even if the ex-post profit of firm i, which is assigned the less
attractive role as the low invest firm, is higher under separation. This point will be further
detailed in Example II below.
3.3 Welfare
We now turn to the welfare properties of the equilibrium characterized in the previous section.
Under separation firms operate as monopsonists and appropriate all local rents. From this
follows directly that given locational separation, the equilibrium R&D intensities maximize
total welfare.
The welfare analysis is more involved under agglomeration because there are competing
eects at play. Firms no longer capture all rents that accrue from their R&D investment.
Instead some of these rents go to the workers in the form of higher wages. This tends to
reduce the R&D investments below the welfare maximizing level. At the same time, however,
there is a strategic eect at play. A firm does not internalize the negative eect that its R&D
investment has on the competitor’s profits, which pushes towards overinvestment in R&D.
A priori, it is unclear how these eects play out and whether there is underinvestment or
overinvestment in R&D.
Aggregate welfare is specified by
WA(!i,!j) =
£
v  u+ (!j)(!j) + (!i)(1 (!j))(!i)
¤
L g(!i) g(!j).
Suppose thatWA(!i,!j) is globally concave in !i and !j for !i  !j , which holds if g(·) is
suciently convex. Then it is easy to verify that the first-order conditions characterizing the
welfare maximizing R&D intensities are identical to (5) and (6). Hence the R&D intensities
chosen by the firms in equilibrium are welfare maximizing, i.e. the two eects leading to
underinvestment and overinvestment, respectively, cancel each other out. A more formal
explanation of this result is the following: The expected contribution of firm i to social
welfare is E[Max{qi  qj , 0}L g(!i)], which is equal to firm i’s expected profit. Therefore,
the firm has the right incentive to invest in quality improvement. Although interesting, we
do not wish to over-emphasize this result as it clearly represents a knife’s edge case. Changes
in the specification of the model, for example in the mode of competition in the labor or
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output markets, could aect the relative strength of the two opposing eects. As a result,
equilibrium R&D investments would no longer be welfare optimal.
The next proposition summarizes the welfare analysis of R&D investments and assesses
the eciency of location choices.
Proposition 4 Suppose that g(·) is suciently convex such that the welfare function is glob-
ally concave in !i and !j for !i  !j. Then
(i) conditional upon locations, firms choose the welfare maximizing R&D intensities,
(ii) welfare is maximized when firms agglomerate.
Towards assessing the eciency of the location equilibrium, it is useful to decompose the
welfare dierence between agglomeration and separation into two eects, an R&D portfolio
eect and a labor productivity eect,
WA(A,Wi , 
A,W
j )W
S(S,W, S,W) =
WA(A,Wi , 
A,W
j )W
A(S,W, S,W)| {z }
R&D portfolio egect
+WA(S,W, S,W)WS(S,W, S,W)| {z }
Labor productivity egect
The labor productivity eect captures the welfare benefit of agglomeration for constant
R&D strategies. As discussed in section 2.2, this eect is positive because under agglomera-
tion the higher quality firm can expand production by hiring all workers. The R&D portfolio
eect represents the welfare benefit of agglomeration, because labor pooling allows for a more
ecient diversified R&D portfolio at the industry level.11 To the best of our knowledge, the
R&D portfolio eect is novel to the labor pooling literature.
The major dierence between the equilibrium R&D strategies under the two locational
choices is that firms choose asymmetric R&D investments under agglomeration but symmetric
R&D investments under separation. To see why asymmetric investments lead to a more
ecient R&D portfolio, suppose that firms would choose symmetric investment levels. Then,
if both firms were successful, the R&D investment of one of the firms would be wasted, i.e.
would not contribute to welfare. Notice that this is not the case under separation as the firms
do not share a common pool of workers. Keeping total investments constant but allocating
them asymmetrically reduces the problem of wasteful R&D duplication under agglomeration.
The investment of the low quality firm is still wasted if the high quality firm is successful.
However, since the low quality firm invests less compared to the situation of symmetric
investments, that waste is reduced. Of course, this argument provokes the question of why it
11Since in equilibrium firms choose the welfare maximizing R&D investments, we have immediately that
WA(4A,Wi , 4
A,W
j ) DW
A(4S,W, 4S,W).
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would not be ecient to allocate all investment to one firm to avoid duplication altogether.
The reason is that there are decreasing returns to R&D investment at the firm level. Thus
the allocation of R&D investment trades o the cost of asymmetric R&D investments due to
decreasing returns to scale, against the cost of wasteful duplication of R&D eorts.12
While the welfare optimality of R&D investments rests on the specific assumptions made
here, this appears not to be the case for the two eects underlying Proposition 4 (ii). The
labor productivity eect relies on the more productive firm hiring more workers than the
less productive firm under agglomeration. All reasonable specifications of labor market com-
petition would yield this outcome, so this eect is clearly robust to dierent specifications
of the model. The R&D portfolio eect arises, because firms have an interest in avoiding
situations where joint R&D success cannibalizes the profits from innovation. Joint success is
also undesirable from point of view of social welfare, because it entails wasteful duplication
of R&D eorts. As public and private interests are aligned on this matter, it seems likely
that also the R&D portfolio eect will remain positive for minor changes in the model.
In order to gain additional insights into the link between R&D strategies and location
decisions, we have constructed two examples involving specific functions for (·), (·), and
g(·) so that the model could be solved in closed-form. We consider the two extreme cases,
one where R&D investment increases only , and another where it only increases .
3.4 Example I: Endogenous Hazard Rate
Here, we consider a setup where firms choose the probability of achieving an innovation of
constant size . In particular, suppose that (!) = ! and g(!) = !2/2 where  measures
the marginal cost of R&D. We assume that  > L/2, to exclude corner solutions. The
equilibrium is derived in the same manner as above, so details are left out.
Since investment does not increase innovation size, there is a symmetric equilibrium also
when firms choose to agglomerate. The investment in R&D per firm is !S,W = L/2 and
!A,W = L/(L + ) under separation and agglomeration, respectively. This results in
equilibrium profits
Si (!
S,W) =
(v  u)L
2
+
2L2
8
,
Ai (!
A,W,!A,W) =
2L2
2(L+ )2
.
12Put digerently, starting from a situation of symmetric investments, a small reallocation of investments
from one firm to the other will result in a second-order reduction in R&D eciency due to decreasing returns to
scale but in a first-order reduction in R&D duplication. Therefore, the welfare maximizing R&D investments
are asymmetric under agglomeration.
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Comparing profits under agglomeration and separation, we find that firms agglomerate
in the first stage if and only if
Ai (!
A,W,!A,W)  Si (!
S,W)/
2L( L)(3 +L)
4( +L)2
> v  u. (9)
In Figure 2 equation (9) is plotted in (,)-space. Notice that in this example the
condition (!A,W) < 1/2 from Proposition 3 (i) is equivalent to  > L. This implies that
for all parameter values above the  = L-line, firms invest more under agglomeration than
under separation and the profits from innovation are higher when firms cluster. However, this
must be weighed against the profits obtained under separation from producing the baseline
product.
Since we can explicitly determine the relevant equilibrium values, it is easier to see the
connection to the benchmark model of section 2 than in the more general setup. Firms
agglomerate if two conditions are met: i) (!A,W) is intermediate between 0 and 1/2, and
ii)  is suciently large compared to v  u. The first condition is violated if the marginal
cost of R&D, , is either too low (and therefore competition under agglomeration tough) or
too high (such that the probability of using the larger labor pool under agglomeration is too
small to outweigh the loss on the basic technology).
agglomeration
separation
'
J
J= L '
eq. (9)
Figure 2: Location equilibria with endogenous hazard rate.
This and the following two examples also suggest a new and potentially testable im-
plication concerning the variance in average product quality of the firms in the industry
under agglomeration and separation. Define the average product quality (= productivity) as
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q = (q1 + q2)/2. Then, the expected average product quality is given by
E[q] = v + 12
1 +2
2
+ 1(1 2)
1
2
+ (1 1)2
2
2
= v +
11 + 22
2
,
and its variance by
V ar[q] = 12(v +
1 +2
2
E(q))2 + 1(1 2)(v +
1
2
E(q))2 +
(1 1)2(v +
2
2
E(q))2 + (1 1)(1 2)(v E(q))
2
=
1
4
[1(1 1)21 + 2(1 2)
2
2].
In the specific example discussed here, V ar[q] = 2W(1  W)/2. Therefore, the variance
under agglomeration is higher (lower) than the variance under separation if |(!A,W)  1/2|
< (>) |(!S,W)  1/2|. However, we know from Proposition 3 that if (!A,W) < 1/2, then
firms invest more in R&D under agglomeration so 1/2 > (!A,W) > (!S,W). Similarly, if
(!A,W) > 1/2, the firms invest less under agglomeration so (!S,W) > (!A,W) > 1/2. This
leads to the empirical prediction that controlling for  the variance in the average quality is
larger under agglomeration than under separation.
3.5 Example II: Endogenous Innovation Size
Suppose now that firms choose the innovation size so that (!) = ! whereas the probability
of success is constant, (!) = . Let the marginal cost of adding to the innovation size be
quadratic as in the previous example.
With separate locations both firms choose the R&D intensity !S,W = L/2. The equilib-
rium profits are
Si (!
S,W) =
(v  u)L
2
+
2L2
8
.
Under agglomeration equilibrium R&D intensities are asymmetric since(!) is increasing
in !. Solving the first-order conditions, we find !A,Wi = (1  )L/ and !
A,W
j = L/. The
more R&D intensive firm j, which produces the highest quality, increases its investment with
higher success probability . By contrast, the less R&D intensive firm i invests the most
when the probability of being successful alone is maximized, i.e. at  = 1/2. Note also that
firm j invests as much in R&D as the two firms together under separation. The resulting
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profits under agglomeration are
Ai (!
A,W
i ,!
A,W
j ) =
(1 )22L2
2
,
Aj (!
A,W
i ,!
A,W
j ) =
2L2(1 2(1 ))
2
.
Comparing ex-ante profits, we find that the firms agglomerate if and only if
v  u 
2L
4
¡
3 8+ 62
¢
= #. (10)
The graph of condition (10) is depicted in (, )-space in Figure 3. The low investment firm
makes higher profits from R&D under agglomeration than under separation if  < 1/2. The
high investment firm always earns higher profits from innovation than under separation. Since
expected profits are increasing more rapidly in  under agglomeration than under separation,
the threshold value of v  u below which firms agglomerate, # in (10), is also increasing
in . Furthermore, and as pointed out in the discussion of Proposition 3, the condition
(!A,Wj )  1/2 is not necessary for agglomeration to occur, because firms choose asymmetric
R&D strategies under agglomeration.
J
U1
separation
agglomeration
1/2
eq.(10)
Figure 3: Location equilibria with endogenous innovation size
The variance in the average industry quality can be calculated as V ar[q] = (1 )[2i +
2j ]/4. Using
A,W
j = 2
S,W, it is now straightforward to show that the variance in the average
industry quality is highest under agglomeration:
(1 )[(Wi )
2 + (2WS)
2]/4| {z }
Variance under agglomeration
> (1 )[(WS)
2 + (WS)
2]/4| {z }
Variance under separation
.
The variance is higher under agglomeration both because firms invest more in R&D overall
and because they choose asymmetric instead of symmetric strategies.
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4 Endogenous Risk-Return Choice
The second important dimension in firms’ R&D strategy is the choice between risk and
return. Specifically, when should a firm target a R&D project with large innovation size but
low probability of success, vs. a less ambitious project that is more likely to be successful?
We consider a variant of the model where firms strategically choose the risk-return profile of
their R&D project at given research outlay.
We start again from a general R&D technology and then look at a specific example. It is
assumed that firm i chooses a level of technical risk i from [, ], 0      1 resulting in
an innovation of size (i). Here, (·) is a C2-function and 0(·) < 0. Finally, we assume
that i) 20(i) + i00(i) < 0 to ensure concavity of the firms’ problem, and ii) corner
solutions can be excluded.13
4.1 Equilibrium and Welfare Analysis
Under separation firm i’s expected profits are
S(i) = i(v  u+(i))L/2 + (1 i)(v  u)L/2
= (v  u+ i(i))L/2.
The firm appropriates all returns from innovation and chooses the risk-return profile that
maximizes expected innovation size, (). The equilibrium probability of success is therefore
given by
(S,W) + S,W0(S,W) = 0. (11)
Under agglomeration, the firm choosing the higher risk aims for the higher innovation
step, and in case both firms are successful, that firm wins over the labor pool. Thus any firm
i’s expected profit can be written as
Ai (i, j) = i(1 j)(i)L+
(
ij((i)(j))L if i  j ,
0 otherwise.
Consider two firms with i  j . Solving for the first-order condition of firm i we get
(A,Wi ) + 
A,W
i 
0(A,Wi ) = 0, (12)
13Define b4 as the unique solution to {(4) + 4{0(4) = 0. Then, the following two conditions are necessary
and sucient to exclude corner solutions: i) {(4) + 4{0(4) < 0, and ii) {(4) + 4{0(4)3 b4{(b4) > 0.
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while firm j’s first-order condition is
(A,Wj ) + 
A,W
j 
0(A,Wj ) 
A,W
i (
A,W
i ) = 0. (13)
The next proposition characterizes the R&D equilibrium under agglomeration.
Proposition 5 Consider the equilibrium in R&D strategies (A,Wi , 
A,W
j ) under agglomera-
tion. There exists a generically unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with A,Wi > 
A,W
j which
satisfies the first-order conditions (12) and (13).
Competition for workers under agglomeration thus induces the firms to choose R&D
projects with strictly dierent technical risks. One of the firms, call it i, chooses a safer project
with a lower innovation size and makes profits if it is successful but its rival is not. Its optimal
R&D project is therefore the one that maximizes the expected innovation size. Firm j, on
the other hand, chooses a project with a higher technical risk and a higher innovation size
target. Although this project has a lower expected innovation size, this strategy is optimal
since it relaxes labor market competition in two ways. It firstly reduces the probability that
both firms are successful and compete away their profits from innovation. Secondly, lowering
j increases the productivity advantage of firm j if both firms’ R&D is successful. Observe
that in equilibrium, the firm with the safer project earns higher expected profits.14
Turning to the first stage of the game, firms choose to agglomerate if
Ai (
A,W
i , 
A,W
j ) + 
A
j (
A,W
i , 
A,W
j )  2
S(S,W).
The following proposition summarizes the firms’ location choice.
Proposition 6 Compare R&D decisions and expected profits from innovation under the two
location choices:
(i) A,Wi = 
S,W  1/2 is a sucient condition for both firms to earn higher profits from R&D
under agglomeration.
(ii) If the expected equilibrium profits accruing from R&D are higher under agglomeration
than under separation, there exists a unique level # > 0 such that in equilibrium, v  u < #
implies agglomeration, and v  u > # implies separation.
Proposition 6 is in line with the previous result that firms tend to agglomerate when the
profitability of the basic quality as well as the equilibrium probabilities of R&D success are
14Firm i with 4i > 4j earns higher profits than firm j if (1 3 4j)4i{(4i)L > 4j{(4j)L 3 4i4j{(4i)L
or 4i{(4i)L > 4j{(4j)L. This inequality always holds in equilibrium because 4
A,W
i maximizes the expected
innovation size and 4A,Wj < 4
A,W
i .
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low. This combination favors agglomeration, because it minimizes the rents that are competed
away in the labor market.
Turning to the welfare analysis, we have that aggregate welfare under separation is equal
to the sum of the firms’ profits while welfare under agglomeration it is
WA(i, j) = (v  u+ j(j) + i(1 j)(i))L.
The following proposition compares equilibrium R&D choices with the welfare maximizing
ones and characterizes the eciency of location decisions.
Proposition 7 Suppose that the welfare function is globally concave in i and j for j  i.
Then
(i) conditional upon locations, firms choose the welfare maximizing R&D projects,
(ii) welfare is maximized when firms agglomerate.
As in the earlier specification in Section 3, firms take the welfare maximizing R&D deci-
sions both under agglomeration and separation, and welfare is higher under agglomeration.
The welfare dierence between agglomeration and separation can again be decomposed into
a labor productivity and an R&D portfolio eect. While the labor productivity eect works
as before, the R&D portfolio eect operates slightly dierently in the present setup where
firms face a R&D risk-return trade-o. To see this, suppose that both firms would choose
S,W under agglomeration. Consider now a slight increase in the risk taken by firm j, i.e. a
reduction of j . Then, if successful, firm j’s innovation will become larger, yet the expected
size of its innovation will become smaller. Under separation this move would reduce welfare,
as expected welfare is increasing in expected innovation size. However, under agglomeration
it increases welfare. Consider the benefit and the cost of increasing risk taking by firm j.
Whilst the benefit in case of R&D success is the same under agglomeration and separation
(controlling for the labor productivity eect), the cost is lower under agglomeration. The
reason is that if firm j is unsuccessful, which is more likely when firm j takes higher risk,
firm i might be successful. If so, firm i can employ the workers productively, which reduces
the welfare cost of firm j’s failure. This explains why one of the firms should take more risk
under agglomeration and also why agglomeration allows for a more ecient portfolio of R&D
projects. The final example III illustrates the above arguments with a simple R&D project
technology.
21
4.2 Example III: Linear Risk-Return Technology
Consider the following simple, linear R&D technology:
i = (1 i).
The parameter  measures firm i’s capacity for R&D, by determining how much i decreases
when i is increased marginally. Notice that the functional form is chosen such that i = 0
for i = 1 for all ; so innovation is always a risky activity.
Suppose first that the firms have chosen separate locations in the first stage of the game.
Solving the firms’ problem, we obtain S,W = 1/2 which implies S,W = /2 and profits under
separation of
S(S,W) = L(v  u+ /4)/2.
Suppose instead that the firms have chosen agglomeration. Solving for the equilibrium in
pure strategies yields
W,Ai =
1
2
, W,Aj =
3
8
The equilibrium profits under agglomeration are
Ai (
W,A
i , 
W,A
j ) =
5L
32
and Aj (
W,A
i , 
W,A
j ) =
9L
64
.
Since W,Ai , 
W,A
j  1/2, the firms earn higher expected profits from R&D under agglomeration
than under separation. A high research capacity  therefore favors agglomeration whereas a
high value of v u as before favors separation. Firms choose the same location if and only if
1
2
Ai (
W,A
i , 
W,A
j ) +
1
2
Aj (
W,A
i , 
W,A
j )  
S(S,W)/ v  u  3/64,
which reflects this trade-o.
The variance in the average quality as a function of the firms’ R&D strategies can be
written as
V ar[q] =
2
4
[1(1 1)
3 + 2(1 2)
3].
Plugging in the equilibrium risk choices, we find also in this example that the variance under
agglomeration (6312/16384 ' 0.03852) is strictly larger than the variance under separation
(2/32 ' 0.031252).
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5 Conclusions
We have developed a model demonstrating some central trade-os involved in the location
decision of research intensive firms. A joint location induces the formation of a large labor
pool for firms to draw from. This allows a firm with a successful R&D project to expand
its production more than under separate locations, which works as an agglomerative force.
At the same time, however, wages increase via tougher competition for workers, which is a
deglomerative force.
From our analysis it emerges that firms tend to agglomerate when the equilibrium prob-
abilities of R&D success are low. This is, for instance, the case when it is very costly to
increase the success probability. We have also developed three specific examples, from all
of which we derive the empirical prediction that controlling for R&D costs there is a higher
variance in average product quality (or, firm productivity) under agglomeration than under
separation.
Turning to welfare, agglomeration leads to two distinct advantages compared to separa-
tion. First, all labor is put to its most productive use under agglomeration but not necessarily
under separation. Second, firms choose a more ecient portfolio of R&D projects under ag-
glomeration. Whence the first eect also arises in models of exogenous productivity shocks
such as Krugman (1991a), the R&D portfolio eect results from the endogenization of firms’
R&D strategy. The eect is novel to the literature on labor pooling and represents one of
the main insights of the paper.
In our model firms always take the welfare maximizing R&D choices conditional upon
location. Furthermore, as agglomeration in a cluster is welfare maximizing but not always the
equilibrium outcome, the policy recommendation is to leave firms’ R&D activities untouched,
but to subsidize the formation of a cluster in situations where firms tend to stay apart; for
instance in form of a tax break, or favorable land prices.15 However, as usual, the welfare
improving implementation of such a policy requires precise knowledge about the conditions
under which such situations arise.
15Such policies are widely used. For instance, the French government announced recently a policy initiative
aimed at supporting six globally competitive clusters and no less than 61 ”poles of competitiveness” (The
Financial Times, 13.07.05). The financial incentives available to these ”poles” are 1.5bn EUR, and the policies
include subsidies to infrastructure investments but also R&D subsidies.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Consider first a symmetric equilibrium where !A,Wj = !
A,W
i = !
A,W. Define:
$1(!i,!A,W)  CAi (!i,!
A,W)/C!i for !i < !A,W,
$2(!i,!
A,W)  CAi (!i,!
A,W)/C!i for !i > !
A,W.
In equilibrium the following necessary conditions need to be satisfied:
$1(!i,!
A,W)  0 for !i $ (!
A,W)3 and
$2(!i,!
A,W)  0 for !i $ (!
A,W)+.
These conditions ensure that !A,Wi = !
A,W is a local maximum for !A,Wj = !
A,W. We have that
lim
i<(A,W)3
[$1(!A,Wi ,!
A,W)] lim
i<(A,W)+
[$2(!A,Wi !
A,W)]
= (!A,W)20(!A,W).
Therefore, there is no symmetric equilibrium if0(!A,W) > 0. Suppose instead that0(!A,W) =
0. The first-order derivative of Ai (!i,!j) is then continuous at !
A,W
i = !
A,W, which implies
that Ai (!i,!
A,W) is globally concave in !i. For 0(!A,W) = 0 the first-order condition (7) is
thus both a necessary and a sucient condition for a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies
to exist.
(ii) Consider now asymmetric equilibria where !A,Wi < !
A,W
j . The first-order conditions (5)
and (6) are necessary for an equilibrium to exist. We need to establish that if there exist
(!A,Wi ,!
A,W
j ) satisfying the first-order conditions, there exist no profitable deviations for the
two firms. Consider firm i. Since the profit function of firm i is concave for !i  !
A,W
j and
(5) is satisfied, there exists no profitable deviation to !i  !
A,W
j . Instead consider a deviation
to !i > !
A,W
j . From symmetry follows that
CAj (!i,!j)/C!j |(i,j)=(A,Wi ,A,Wj )= C
A
i (!i,!j)/C!i |(i,j)=(A,Wj ,A,Wi )= 0.
Since Ai (!i,!j) is concave for !i > !j , this implies that
CAi (!i,!j)/C!i |(i,j)=(A,Wj +0,A,Wi ) 0
for all % > 0. Finally, as C2Ai (!i,!j)/C!iC!j < 0, we have that
CAi (!i,!j)/C!
A
i < 0 |(i,j)=(A,Wj +0,A,Wj ) ;% > 0.
24
Continuity of Ai (!i,!j) then implies that there exists no profitable deviation to !i > !
A,W
j .
A similar argument establishes that firm j neither has an incentive to deviate.
Existence and uniqueness of this equilibrium is established in the proof of Part (i) of
Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) In a symmetric equilibrium the first-order conditions (5) and (6) collapse into (7). It follows
directly from a comparison of (4) and (7) that !A,W  !S,W if and only if (!A,W)  1/2.
The profits from R&D investment are (!S,W)(!S,W)L/2  g(!S,W) under separation and
Ai (!
A,W,!A,W) under agglomeration. Using !A,W  !S,W, it follows that the profits from R&D
investment are highest under agglomeration for (!A,W)  1/2 as
(!S,W)(!S,W)L/2 g(!S,W)  Ai (!
S,W,!A,W)  Ai (!
A,W,!A,W).
A similar argument establishes that profits from innovation are highest under separation for
(!A,W) > 1/2.
(ii) It follows directly from a comparison of the first-order conditions (4) and (5) that !A,Wi 
!S,W if and only if (!A,Wj )  1/2. Since !
A,W
i = !
S,W if (!A,Wj ) = 1/2, we have that
(!S,W)(!S,W)L/2 g(!S,W) = Ai (!
A,W
i ,!
A,W
j ).
The fact that firm j earns higher equilibrium profits than firm i and CAi (!i,!j)/C(!j) =
(!i)(!i)L < 0 imply that
(!S,W)(!S,W)L/2 g(!S,W)  Ai (!
A,W
i ,!
A,W
j ) < 
A
j (!
A,W
i ,!
A,W
j )
if and only if (!A,Wj )  1/2.
(iii) Reformulating the profits under separation shows that v  u merely shifts profits, and
bears no impact on the determination of !i. Hence a unique level of vu exists above which
separation is preferred. Moreover, this level of v  u is strictly positive if both firms invest
more and the expected profits from their investments in R&D are higher under agglomeration,
which the conditions of statement (i) and (ii) of this proposition ensure.
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) To ensure a strictly globally concave welfare function we assume throughout our analysis
that
(i) Wii,Wjj < 0,
(ii) WiiWjj WijWji > 0,
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where Wij = C2W/C!iC!j . As can be easily checked, both conditions are satisfied if g(·) is
suciently convex.
The equilibrium and the welfare maximizing R&D investments solve the same first-order
conditions, (5) and (6). Since the welfare function is globally concave under the assumption
that g(·) is suciently convex, there exists a unique (!A,Wi ,!A,Wj ) that solves the first-order
conditions (modulo firm symmetry). Hence, we can also conclude that there exists one and
only one pair that solves the equilibrium conditions of Proposition 2.
(ii) We have that
WS(!S,W,!S,W) WA(!S,W,!S,W) WA(!A,Wi ,!
A,W
j )
where the first inequality follows from the welfare analysis of the benchmark model presented
in section 2. This proves the second part of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5
Since A,Wi is independent of 
A,W
j , it follows from concavity plus the additional assumptions
made on the curvature of the profit function that there exists a unique and interior solution
to (12), A,Wi . Given 
A,W
i , the same assumptions ensure a unique and interior best-response
of firm j, A,Wj . Therefore, there exists a unique solution to the first-order conditions (12)
and (13) (modulo firm symmetry). It remains to be shown that the firms do not want to
deviate from (A,Wi , 
A,W
j ). Consider firm i. We have that Ci/Ci $ (
A,W
j )
20(A,Wj ) > 0 for
i $ (
A,W
j ) and Ci/Ci $ (
A,W
j ) + 
A,W
j 
0(A,Wj ) > 0 for i $ (
A,W
j )+. Since the profit
function is concave in i for i < 
A,W
j and for i > 
A,W
j as well as continuous at i = 
A,W
j ,
we have that A,Wi is a global maximum. A similar argument establishes that firm j neither
has an incentive to deviate.
Proof of Proposition 6
(i) Suppose that A,Wi = 
A,W
j = 
S,W  1/2. Then, the profits that accrue from R&D under
agglomeration are no less than under separation as S,W(1 S,W)(S,W)L  S,W(S,W)L/2.
In equilibrium, A,Wj < 
A,W
i = 
S,W  1/2. Therefore, firm i earns strictly higher profits from
R&D under agglomeration. A revealed preference argument establishes that firm j earns no
less from R&D under agglomeration.
(ii) Identical to the proof of Proposition 3 (iii).
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Proof of Proposition 7
(i) The first-order conditions characterizing the welfare maximizing R&D hazard rates are
identical to (12) and (13). Therefore, the firms choose the welfare maximizing R&D projects
in equilibrium.
(ii) The only thing left to show is that welfare is maximized when firms agglomerate. This
holds as WS(S,W, S,W)  WA(S,W, S,W)  WA(A,Wi , 
A,W
j ) where the first inequality follows
from the welfare analysis of the baseline model.
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